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CORALEE GREENHALGH, 
individually and as Guardian Ad 
Litem for the minor 
PATRICK GREENHALGH and 
WILLIAM T. GREENHALGH, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
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DOCTOR ROBERT HOGAN 
and PAYSON CITY HOSPITAL 
through its Board of Directors and 
PAYSON CITY as the sole owner 
and proprietor of PAYSON CITY 
HOSPITAL, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
PAYSON CITY HOSPITAL AND 
PAYSON CITY 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a malpractice action against defendant doc-
tor and defendant hospital for alleged negligent care of 
plaintiffs Coralee Greenhalgh and her infant son, Patrick 
Greenhalgh, during their confinement in defendant hos-
pital for childbirth and postnatal care, for damages 
allegedly sustained by all of the plaintiffs as a result of 
the alleged negligence upon the part of the defendants. 
Case No. 
13695 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Motions of defendants Payson City and Payson City 
Hospital to dismiss the complaint were granted for fail-
ure upon the part of plaintiffs to comply with the notice 
requirements of Section 63-30-13, U.C.A., 1953, as 
amended. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
These defendants seek an affirmance of the judg-
ment below. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action was commenced by the filing of a com-
plaint in the District Court of Utah County on December 
18, 1973. (R. 3.) It is alleged in the complaint that the 
defendant Payson City Hospital is a separate entity and 
wholly owned proprietorship of Payson City and operated 
for profit. (R. 3-4, 8, 15.) It is further alleged that plain-
tiff Coralee Greenhalgh entered defendant hospital for 
childbirth on January 14, 1970, and that her infant son, 
plaintiff Patrick Greenhalgh, was born at the hospital on 
the same date (R. 4, 8, 11, 15.); and that defendant hos-
pital was negligent in incorrectly blood-typing the two 
plaintiffs, and that by reason thereof, and by reason of 
failure timely to discover this error, both plaintiffs sus-
tained serious personal injuries. (R. 9, 10, 16.) It is further 
alleged that this error was discovered on or about January 
18, 1970, four days after the date of birth, and that the 
infant plaintiff was transferred to Utah County [sic] Hos-
pital for further treatment on that date. (R. 16.) There is 
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no allegation that any notice of claim was ever given to 
defendant hospital or to defendant city. Nor have plain-
tiffs claimed, in any subsequent proceedings, that any 
notice was ever given to these defendants prior to the 
filing of this action. 
For this failure to comply with the notice provisions 
of the Governmental Immunity Act, and also by reason 
of the statute of limitations applicable to cities and ap-
plicable to malpractice actions, this defendant moved to 
dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint. (R.30.) This motion 
was supported by a memorandum of authorities. (R.32-37.) 
This motion was argued before Judge Sorensen and 
was taken under advisement. (R. 58.) Subsequently, after 
an exchange of letter memoranda, (R. 59-62), this defend-
ant's motion was granted. (R. 64, 66-67.) This appeal 
followed. (R. 74-75.) 
ARGUMENT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Prior to 1965, Utah adhered to the traditional rule 
of governmental immunity. The state and its subdivi-
sions were immune from suit for tort liability except in 
situations where there had been a consent to suit or im-
munity had been waived. An exception was in the case of 
municipal corporations where it was held that cities were 
subject to tort liability for torts committed in the perfor-
mance of proprietary acts, but not in the performance of 
governmental acts. This rule also was in accord with the 
general law prevailing at that time. However, there were 
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no precise definitions as to what functions were consid-
ered governmental, and what functions were considered 
proprietary. With respect to certain types of activities, 
there were conflicts among the decisions of the courts 
as to whether a particular activity was considered to be 
governmental or proprietary, some courts holding one way 
and some another. In some instances, determinations 
were made on the basis of whether admission fees were 
charged, or whether the activity resulted in profit to the 
municipality, or whether private enterprise was engaged 
in the same type of activity. These determinations were 
made on a case by case basis. Even under this rule, per-
sons seeking to sue cities for alleged tort liability were re-
quired to give notice as required by Section 10-7-77, 
U.C.A., 1953. Dahl v. Salt Lake City, 45 U. 544, 147 P. 
622; Hamilton v. Salt Lake City, 99 U. 362, 106 P. 2d 
1028. 
In 1965, the legislature adopted the Governmental 
Immunity Act. Section 63-30-1, et seq., U.C.A., 1953, as 
amended. This statute took away the cloak of governmen-
tal immunity over a broad area of tort liability, including 
the negligence field. In enacting this statute, the legis-
lature made no specific provision with regard to the for-
mer doctrine of proprietary functions. We do not suggest 
that it was the intent of the legislature to eliminate or 
take away any rights which had previously existed, but 
rather to enlarge and expand concepts of civil liability in 
tort of governmental agencies, and also to spell out a uni-
form procedure by which such claims could be enforced. 
In the new statute, the legislature provided clearly 
and explicitly for the time and kind of notice of claim as 
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a necessary prerequisite to an action in tort. Under the 
Governmental Immunity Act, the claimant has 90 days 
in which to present a claim. The only exception provided 
is that for claims arising under Section 63-30-8, U.C.A., 
1953, (which is wholly inapplicable here). Section 63-30-
13,U.CA., 1953. 
It is undisputed that plaintiffs have wholly failed to 
comply with the notice requirements of Section 63-30-13. 
Recognizing the infirmity of their position, they have 
sought to avoid its fatal consequences, by claiming that 
they are proceeding, not under the Governmental Immu-
nity Act, but under the common law. However, under 
either theory, the language of Section 63-30-13 mandates 
a notice as follows: "A claim against a political subdivision 
shall be forever barred unless notice thereof is filed within 
ninety days after the cause of action arises . . . " Even if it 
can be said that the Governmental Immunity Act did not 
procedurally affect rights of action against municipal 
corporations acting in their proprietary capacity, plain-
tiffs have still failed to comply with the notice require-
ments of Section 10-7-77, U.C.A., 1953, and are, therefore, 
in any event barred from pursuing this action as against 
the defendant city. 
One further point must be noted. It is alleged that 
defendant hospital is a separate entity. While we recog-
nize that allegations well plead must be accepted as true, 
this allegation is clearly incorrect. Payson City Hospital 
was and could have been created only under the provisions 
of Section 10-8-90, U.C.A., 1953, authorizing cities and 
towns "to construct, own and operate hospitals." (Em-
phasis added.) Section 10-8-91 authorizes cities and towns 
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to levy taxes for the purpose of operating such hospitals. 
There is no statutory authority for creation of a hospital 
as a separate entity, nor was there any attempt in this 
case to create the hospital as a separate entity. Neither is 
there any statutory authority for hospitals created under 
these statutes to sue and be sued. This point has come be-
fore the Supreme Court of our sister state of Nevada in 
several recent cases. It has consistently held that where a 
hospital is created under a statute similar to the Utah act, 
that it is not a separate entity and is not subject to suit as 
such, although the municipal corporation which owns and 
operates it is subject to suit. McKay v. Washae General 
Hospital, (Nev.), 33 P. 2d 755, (1934); Bloom v. Southern 
Nevada Memorial Hospital, (Nev.), 275 P. 2d 885, 
(1954); and King v. Baskin, (Nev.), 511 P. 2d 1115, (1973). 
We submit, therefore, that the Payson City Hospital is not 
an entity and is not subject to suit under any theory, and 
that any claim against it must be asserted and pursued as 
against Payson City, the owner and operator of the hos-
pital. The case of Nestman v. South Davis County Water 
Improvement District, 16 Ut. 2d 198, 298 P. 2d 203, cited 
and relied upon by plaintiffs is wholly inapplicable here. 
The water district was created under an entirely different 
statute giving it status as an autonomous and individual 
entity with the right to "sue and be sued". Section 17-6-3.4, 
U.C.A., 1953. N o such provisions are found in Sections 
10-8-90, et seq. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
POINT I 
THE ACTION IS BARRED FOR FAILURE TO COM-
PLY WITH THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF 
SECTION 63-30-13. 
That the Governmental Immunity Act applies to 
cities is specifically provided in Section 63-30-2 (2), 
U.C.A., 1953. Section 63-30-13, U.C.A, 1953, provides 
that a claim against a political subdivision "shall be for-
ever barred unless notice thereof is filed within 90 days 
after the cause of action arises". There is no allegation in 
the complaint of the filing of any notice of claim within 
90 days after the cause of action arose. It appears that 
the alleged cause of action arose in January, 1970, and 
such a claim would have to have been filed no later than 
April of that year. The mere fact that one of the plaintiffs 
is a minor would not relieve either the minor or any of 
the other plaintiffs from the necessity of filing notice of 
claim as required by the act. Gallegos v. Midvale City, 27 
Ut. 2d 27, 492 P. 2d 1335; Varoz v. Sevey, 29 Ut. 2d 158, 
506 P. 2d 435; Whitaker v. Salt Lake City, Ut. 
2d , 522 P. 2d 1252. 
Assuming that a notice was timely filed and the fact 
simply not alleged in the complaint, defendant city would 
have had 90 days thereafter in which to act upon it, and 
if it had not acted within 90 days the claim would have 
been deemed denied. Section 63-30-14, U.C.A., 1953. 
This would have been no later than July, 1970. Plaintiffs 
would have had one year thereafter within which to com-
mence action. Sec. 63-30-15, U.C.A., 1953. This period 
would have expired in July, 1971. The claim is therefore 
clearly barred by these provisions. 
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POINT II 
ANY CLAIM BY PLAINTIFFS AGAINST THESE 
DEFENDANTS APART FROM THE GOVERNMEN-
TAL IMMUNITY ACT IS BARRED FOR FAILURE TO 
GIVE NOTICE AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 10-7-77. 
As we have previously attempted to demonstrate, it 
appears to have been the intent of the legislature to es-
tablish one system of procedural law equally applicable to 
all claims against governmental subdivisions, whether 
arising out of governmental or proprietary activities. If 
the court finds that we are correct in this position, it is 
clear that plaintiffs' action is barred, since there has. been 
no compliance with the provisions of Section 63-30-13. 
However, even if the court takes a different view of the 
matter and concludes that previously existing rights of 
action for tortious acts performed in a proprietary capacity 
are actionable under the former procedural system, it is 
equally clear that the plaintiffs have failed to comply 
even with the former law. Plaintiffs apparently labor 
under the misapprehension that prior to the enactment of 
the Governmental Immunity Act, notice to the defendant 
city was not a necessary prerequisite to maintenance of 
an action. This is clearly erroneous. 
Section 10-7-77, U.C.A., 1953, appears to have been 
on the statute books since 1898. After providing that 
claims against cities and towns for damages alleged to 
have been caused by defective streets, alleys, sidewalks, 
etc., must be presented within 30 days, the statute goes 
on to provide as follows: 
M
. . . Every claim, other than claims above men-
tioned, against any city or town must be presented, 
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properly itemized or described and verified as to 
correctness by the claimant or his agent, to the 
governing body within one year after the last item 
of such account or claim accrued, and if such ac-
count or claim is not properly or sufficiently 
itemized or described or verified, the governing 
body may require the same to be made more 
specific as to itemization or description, or to be 
corrected as to the verification thereof." 
Section 10-7-78, U.C.A., 1953, insofar as material 
here, provides as follows: 
"It shall be a sufficient bar and answer to any 
action or proceeding against a city or town in any 
court for the collection of any claim mentioned in 
section 10-7-77, that such claim had not been 
presented to the governing body of such city or 
town in the manner and within the time specified 
in section 10-7-77; . . ." 
The language of the foregoing statute, and the deci-
sions of this court thereunder, make clear that compliance 
with this provision is mandatory, and a necessary pre-
requisite to maintenance of an action, even on a theory 
of proprietary acts. Dahl v. Salt Lake City, 45 Ut. 544, 
147 P. 622; Hurley v. Town of Bingham, 63 Ut. 589, 228 
P. 213; and Hamilton v. Salt Lake City, 99 Ut. 362, 106 
P. 2d 1028. 
As said in Dahl v. Salt Lake City, supra,: 
". . . It will be noticed that the statute is compre-
hensive and sweeping in its terms respecting the 
claims that must be presented to the city council 
before an action can be brought and successfully 
maintained thereon . . . That the Legislature may, 
by statute, prescribe conditions upon which suits 
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may be brought and maintained against a munici-
pality is conceded. It being admitted that the 
claims here involved were not presented to the city 
authorities within the time fixed by section 312, 
it necessarily follows that the action is barred by 
section 313 and cannot be maintained. The case 
is therefore reversed, with directions to the district 
court to vacate the judgment and dismiss the 
action. . . " (Emphasis added.) 
Plaintiffs misconceive the holding of this case. The 
city was not engaged in a governmental act, as asserted by 
plaintiffs on page 11 of their brief. Had the city been 
engaged in a governmental act, that would have been a 
sufficient defense in that action. Prior to the Governmen-
tal Immunity Act of 1965 there was no right of action 
against a city for tortious acts committed in its govern-
mental capacity. 
In a final last ditch effort to avoid the consequences 
of their failure to comply with Section 10-7-77, plaintiffs 
suggest that since they allege that expenses arising from 
the claimed negligence are continuing to accrue, the time 
period has not yet started to run. Carrying this logic to 
its ultimate conclusion, the time would never start to run 
in the case of a claimant who was permanently injured 
and required continuing care. Nothing is more clear in 
our statutes than that cities are entitled to prompt notice 
of claims, so that they can make a reasonable investigation 
into their validity. The statute refers to "accounts" and 
"claims" as separate items. Accounts would 'refer to con-
tractual obligations for goods or services furnished. 
Claims would refer to tort claims which accrue when the 
accident or injury occurs, not when the last medical bill 
is paid. 
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POINT III 
THE ACTION IS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS. 
Although we believe this point to be superfluous, we 
also observe that Section 78-12-30, U.C.A., 1953, provides 
for a one year statute of limitations on actions or claims 
against cities and Section 78-12-28 (3), U.C.A., 1953, as 
amended by the laws of 1971, provides a two year statute 
of limitations as against both doctors and hospitals. This 
action was filed more than two years after the effective 
date of the statute last cited and is barred by both of the 
above cited statutes. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs have admittedly failed to comply with the 
notice requirements necessary to perfect any claim they 
may have against defendant Payson City arising out of 
the operation or management of its hospital, and accord-
ingly, the trial court correctly dismissed their action as 
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